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TITLE VII REMEDIES: LIFTING THE
STATUTORY CAPS FROM THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 TO ACHIEVE
EQUAL REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' represents a landmark in
employment discrimination legislation.2 Title VII protects against dis-
crimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin' in virtually
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressed dis-
crimination in many areas of American society. See, e.g., Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-
1973 (1988) (voting rights); Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination and segregation in public places); Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6
(1988) (prohibiting discrimination by those who receive public funding); Title VIII, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988) (prohibiting housing discrimination).
2. MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 6 (1990) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [is] the centerpiece of
employment discrimination law").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2 (West Supp. 1992). Although the coverage of Title VII is expansive, it is not
all-inclusive. For this reason, Congress has enacted legislation to protect other classes
of people who are frequently subject to employment discrimination. For example, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)
protects people over the age of forty from discrimination, and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), as amended by Act of
Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12209, 12111-12112 (West Supp. 1992), protects the
disabled from discrimination.
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every aspect of the employment relationship.4 The 1964 Act gave
courts the authority to use equitable remedies to eradicate discrimina-
tion from the work place.' Despite some progress, after twenty-five
years under the 1964 Act, it became evident that employment discrimi-
nation victims did not receive complete compensation for their injuries
under the then existing law.6 As a result, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to provide courts with the power to award victims
of employment discrimination both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages,7 in addition to traditional equitable remedies.'
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. From the outset of the employment relationship, for in-
stance, Title VII prohibits discriminatory hiring practices. The law states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Title VII covers the employment practices of labor unions
and employment agencies, as well as "governments, government agencies, [and other]
political subdivisions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (West Supp. 1992). See infra note 18 for the text of this provision.
6. See generally Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond
Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 299 (1991) ("[S]exually harassed wo-
men who succeed in Title VII suits are rarely compensated for the actual extent of the
harms they suffer"); Ellen J. Vargyas et al., Title VII's Failed Promise: The Impact of
the Lack of a Damages Remedy, (report by the National Women's Law Center) (1991
Update); Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relieffor Hostile Work Environment Discrimina-
tion: Restoring Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611 (1990) (arguing that
the limited remedies that are available undermine the rights created under Title VII).
See infra notes 17-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors that brought
out the inadequacy of Title VII's remedies.
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West Supp. 1992). Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 amends the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and provides for awards of compensatory
damages in cases of intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 198la(a)(1). The
Supreme Court has realized the difficulty in proving the intent of an employer in dis-
crimination cases. To aid a plaintiff's burden, the Court developed a standard whereby
the employer's intent may be inferred in certain contexts. International Bd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977) ("The proof of the pattern or practice
supports an inference that any particular employment decision, during the period in
which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy"). Id.
Congress has expressly excluded compensatory and punitive damages as remedies for
discrimination claims under the disparate impact model, one that does not rely on the
employer's intent. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(l)-(2). Section 102 does, however, allow pu-
nitive damages in cases where the employer has acted "with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981a(b)(1). See infra note 83 for the text of this provision.
8. Section 102 clarifies that the compensatory damages the Act authorizes do "not
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The addition of compensatory and punitive damages to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 was a product of congressional compromise.9 Pro-
ponents of tort reform insisted on statutory caps, which vary according
to the size of the employer, to limit the amount of non-economic com-
pensatory and punitive damages that victims of intentional discrimina-
tion may recover.'0 While some individuals advocate statutory caps on
punitive damages as a key method of tort reform,11 others reject such
limitations,12 particularly in instances of intentional misconduct. 3
The limitation of damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has raised
criticism from members of both of the leading political parties.' 4 In
fact, less than one week after President Bush signed the 1991 Act into
law, 5 leading senators from each of the two parties proposed bills to
include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under sec-
tion [2000e-5(g)(l)]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(2).
9. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text describing the veto and ensuing
debate over the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
10. Section 198la(b)(3) is the limitations provision of the 1991 Act. See infra note
84 for the full text of the provision.
11. Upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law, President Bush stated,
"IT]he adoption of these limits on jury awards sets an important precedent, and I hope
to see this model followed as part of an initiative to reform the nation's tort system."
President Bush's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 226 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) at D-I (Nov. 21, 1991). See generally James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Coles, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117,
1154-65 (1984) (advocating limitations on punitive damages). See infra notes 112-122
and accompanying text for a summary of proponents' arguments for limiting damages.
12. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Dam-
ages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1990) (offering an empirical examination of tort reformers'
assertions on the effects of punitive damages); Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institu-
tions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990) (examining
the viability of punitive and non-economic compensatory damages from the various
perspectives of interested parties). See infra notes 123-132 and accompanying text for a
summary of opponents' arguments against limiting damages.
13. See Sales & Coles, supra note 11, at 1130 (arguing that most courts and com-
mentators are not hesitant to adopt the proposition that punitive damages are valid
when the defendant's behavior is intentional); Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Puni-
tive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303
(1991) (rejecting the use of statutory caps or limitations for intentional conduct). See
infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons for not limit-
ing punitive damages in cases of intentional misconduct.
14. See generally Charge of the Rights Brigade, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at E2
(noting that United States senators of the Republican and Democratic parties oppose
the punitive damages caps in the 1991 Act).
15. The President signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, into law on Novem-
ber 21, 1991.
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lift the caps on compensatory and punitive damages from the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.16
This Note examines the damages provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which serves to limit the amount of compensatory and punitive
damages available to victims of intentional employment discrimination.
Part I discusses the legal and social developments that prompted the
call for expanded remedies under Title VII. Part I then examines the
legislative history of the 1991 Act, including President Bush's veto of
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, the ensuing debates pertaining to caps on
damages, and the final compromise leading to enactment of the bill. In
addition, Part I discusses the recent proposals in the Senate to lift the
caps on damages from the 1991 Act. Part II discusses the purposes
that statutory caps serve in tort reform. Specifically, Part II analyzes
the arguments from proponents and opponents in the debate over stat-
utory caps. Part III attempts to draw an analogy from section 1981
case law and distinguish the purposes and functions of tort law. This
Note concludes that Congress should lift all caps on damages in cases
of intentional employment discrimination in order to accomplish the
goal of fully compensating protected classes of employees.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
A. Background: Equitable Remedies Exposed as Inadequate
Originally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196417 provided
courts with the power to award backpay and any other equitable relief
deemed appropriate. 18 After considering the legislative history of the
16. 137 CONG. REc. S18,337-38 & S18,375 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (remarks of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). On November 26, 1991, Senator Hatch introduced the
Employee Equity and Job Preservation Act of 1991 (S. 2053). Id. at S18,337. On that
same day Senator Kennedy introduced the Equal Remedies Act of 1991 (S. 2062). Id.
at S18,375. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text for a description of these two
proposals.
17. Congress amended the original Civil Rights Act of 1964 in 1972. All references
in this Note to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 include the 1972 amendments. For a sec-
tion by section analysis of the 1972 amendments, see 3A ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, app. 1A (1992) [hereinafter LARSON].
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in... an unlaw-
ful employment practice .... the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging
in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of




1964 Act, courts unanimously construed the damages provision to pro-
hibit them from fashioning legal relief' 9 such as compensatory and pu-
nitive damages.20 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to specify the remedies available under the Act, and
Id.
19. The courts that carefully analyzed the issue noted that the legislative history
revealed Congress' intention to eradicate discrimination by promoting qualification-
based employment criteria as opposed to focusing on the punishment of offenders. In
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the court consid-
ered three elements of the legislation and concluded that Congress intended only equita-
ble remedies. First, the court looked to a Senate study that stated that the remedial
provisions of the Act "[were] intended to give the courts wide discretion in exercising
their equitable powers." Id. at 837 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 3462). Second, the legis-
lative history indicated that the Act was modeled after the National Labor Relations
Act, which does not permit compensatory damages. Id. Finally, the fact that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act expressly provided for compensatory damages persuaded the
court to conclude that Congress intended only equitable remedies. Id. at 837-38. See
also Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363,
1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (relying on Van Hoomissen and concluding that the "primary
objective" of Congress in enacting Title VII "was a prophylactic one," which it in-
tended to accomplish by providing courts with a "wide panorama of equitable tools").
But cf. Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII
Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1314 (1990) ("These bases for the limitation
on remedy are not without some foundation. In a superficial sense, they accurately
reflect the statute's legislative history. A closer examination of the development of Title
VII, however, reveals that Congress never gave serious thought to the question of mone-
tary relief").
20. An argument exists for construing the section as permitting compensatory and
punitive damages. Indeed, a few of the early cases did permit such damages. See, e.g.,
Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. La. 1975) (awarding punitive
damages), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 83 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub
nom. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Claiborne, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); Humphrey v. South-
western Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (denying defendant's
motion to strike pleadings on the grounds that compensatory damages are not allowed
under the Act), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1973); Stamps v. Detroit
Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (awarding punitive damages), rev'd sub
nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
Despite these early cases, however, courts have unanimously rejected compensatory
and punitive damages as an available remedy under Title VII. See, e.g., Bennet v. Cor-
roon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988) (refusing to award compensatory
damages); Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that puni-
tive and compensatory damages are not available under the Act); Muldrew v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); Walker v. Ford Motor Co.,
684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 642 F.2d 268 (9th
Cir. 1981) (same). See also 2 LARSON, supra note 17, § 55.41 (discussing the unlikeli-
hood of recovering legal forms of relief under Title VII).
For a discussion of the legislative and judicial history of the "back-pay remedy," see
Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1312-27.
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to extend coverage of the Act's legal remedies to include victims of
intentional sex, religious, and disability discrimination under Title
VII.21
At least three factors prompted the need for the 1991 amendment.
22
The first and most significant of these factors was the disparity between
the remedies and protections available under section 1981 and Title
VII.23 In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,24 the Supreme
Court held that a private cause of action, including the right to com-
pensatory and punitive damages, existed under section 1981 for victims
of intentional racial employment discrimination. 5 Prior to Johnson,
the lower courts relied on Title VII as a basis for formulating remedies
under section 1981.26 After Johnson, however, courts were free to
award both compensatory and punitive damages to employees who suf-
fered discrimination based upon their race.27 Additionally, unlike Title
VII, section 1981 provided protection to victims of discrimination re-
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981 (West Supp. 1992). This section provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secur-
ity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(a).
22. Generally, the factors leading to the amendment in the federal law can be sum-
marized as (1) the disparity between the coverage in section 1981 and Title VII, (2)
society's increased awareness of sexual harassment in the workplace, and (3) the pro-
gressive efforts in state laws to establish legal and equitable relief from employment
discrimination. See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
23. See Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1357 (noting the disparities in relief, both in
amount and availability).
24. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
25. Id. at 460-61. Originally, in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and
again in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the Supreme Court maintained that
§ 1981 applied only to state action. Not until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968), did the Court effectively overrule Hodges by stating that a private cause of
action existed under § 1982, a companion statute to § 1981. 392 U.S. at 420-40.
26. See, eg., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1977)
(noting that courts had the same remedial power under § 1981 as under Title VII),
vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211, 252 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that courts had discretion to award back pay
under both Title VII and § 1981).
27. 421 U.S. at 460. The Supreme Court stated that "[a]n individual who estab-
lishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief." Id.
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gardless of the size of the employer28 and allowed recovery of back pay
for an indefinite period of time.29 Because section 1981 only protected
against racial discrimination, however, victims of other forms of dis-
criminatory practices who suffered virtually identical treatment, recov-
ered significantly smaller, and less complete, awards than those who
encountered discrimination on account of race.30
The heightened awareness of both the prevalence and severity of
hostility toward minorities, women, and the disabled in the work-
place 31 served as a second factor that influenced Congress to expand
the remedies available to victims of employment discrimination. In the
mid-1970s, courts began to recognize a public policy exception32 to the
28. Only employers with fifteen or more employees are subject to liability under
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
29. Title VII only allows a victim to collect for discrimination from a certain date.
It provides: "Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior
to the filing of a charge with the (Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). See Cynthia L. Alexander, Project, The Defeat of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 595, 621-25 (1991) (analyzing the relationship between remedies under § 1981
and Title VII). For a complete discussion of back pay liability under § 1981 and Title
VII, see James L. Hughes et al., Project, Backpay in Employment Discrimination Cases,
35 VAND. L. Rrv. 893 (1982).
30. Compare Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986) (victim
of severe racial harassment awarded $25,000 for indignity and stress and $25,000 in
punitive damages under § 1981) with Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (victim of severe sexual harassment recovered injunctive relief
and one dollar in nominal damages under Title VII). For an in depth comparison of the
different ways courts have assessed damages under § 1981 and Title VII, see Vargyas et
al., supra note 6 at 11-21, 25.
31. For instance, in enacting the American with Disabilities Act, Congress stated
the following as its findings with respect to the treatment of the disabled:
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with dis-
abilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as employment;...
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrim-
ination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of ar-
chitectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and
policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusion-
ary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser serv-
ices, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)-(9).
32. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), the court held that
an employer breached an "at-will" employment contract when the employer discharged
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"at-will" contract principle that traditionally governed the employ-
ment relationship. 3 This was a significant advance toward protecting
workers against wrongful or retaliatory discharge.3 4 Nonetheless, this
exception proved problematic for several reasons.35 In the Title VII
context, many courts refused to find a common law tort remedy when a
remedy was provided under a state or federal statute.3 6 Often, victims
the employee for refusing a supervisor's sexual advances. Even though the terms of an
"at-will" employment contract enable an employer to discharge an employee at the will
of the employer, he may not do so for reasons that are contrary to public policy. Id. at
551. The New Hampshire Supreme Court is generally cited as creating the public pol-
icy exception, but commentators agree that the public policy exception originated in
Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959). See 3 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 37.2,
at 441 (1988). In Petermann, the court held that it was impermissible to discharge an
employee under an "at will" employment contract for refusing to commit perjury.
The traditional formulation of the public policy exception provides that an employee
may recover damages from the employer if the employee is discharged for reasons that
undermine an important public policy. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARM. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (1983)
("The basis of the exception is the duty of the employer to refrain from firing an em-
ployee for reasons that contravene fundamental principles of public policy").
33. "At-will" employment is the principle that, unless the parties to an employment
agreement specify the duration of their relationship, there is no presumption that a time
guarantee was contemplated, and either party may terminate the relationship at any
time for any reason. See H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). Despite the fact that this principle was a stark depar-
ture from English law, and not based on sound authority, American courts adopted the
principle as the "American rule." See 3 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 32, § 36.1, at
383-84.
34. Cf. Note, supra note 32, at 1935 (estimating that up to 200,000 fewer dis-
charges would occur if a "just cause" discharge policy existed).
35. 3 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 32, § 37.2, at 412-16. One problem was that
courts disagreed as to what constituted a sufficient public policy basis to invoke protec-
tion from retaliatory discharge. Id. at 412. Another area of contention focused on the
ways employers could implicate public policy; one could insist that an employee violate
public policy, or by discharging an employee, the employer could deter other employees
from engaging in socially useful activities. Id. at 413. Another commentator has sug-
gested that lower skilled employees are not afforded protections under the exception
because of bias in the system. Note, supra note 32, at 1937-51.
36. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding no
common law claim available for discharge when statutory remedy in Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act was exclusive); Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692
F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting wrongful discharge cause of action when administrative remedy existed);
Crews v. Memorex, Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984) (common law claim for
discharge in violation of public policy precluded by Massachusetts employment discrim-
ination statute); Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983) (employ-
ment discrimination statute precludes wrongful discharge claim). But see, e.g.,
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of Title VII discrimination were not able to recover the legal remedies
available to tort plaintiffs who were subject to identical treatment.
As courts began to protect employees from retaliatory discharges,
the widespread and debilitating effects of sexual harassment surfaced as
an issue in American society." In the late 1970s and early 1980s, stud-
ies that examined the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the work-
place illustrated the national scope of the problem.38 Subsequent
studies also attested to the emotional and psychological effects that the
harassment creates.39 In the 1986 case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son," the Supreme Court unanimously held that sexual harassment
created a cause of action under Title VII. Despite the Supreme
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffunder
ADEA could maintain pendent state claim for wrongful discharge). For a thorough
analysis of the availability of a common law wrongful discharge claim, see Marc D.
Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65
(1985).
37. See generally NANCY H. DEANE & DARREL L. TILLAR, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT: AN EMPLOYMENT ISSUE (1981) (studying the problem of sexual harassment
and providing a suggested method for prevention).
38. In 1976, Redbook magazine published a questionnaire entitled, "How Do You
Handle Sex on the Job?" and received over 9,000 responses. Nearly 90% of the women
responded that they had experienced unwanted sexual attention at work, and nearly
half said they knew someone who had quit their job, or whose employer had fired them,
as a result of sexual harassment. Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job. A
Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149.
In 1981, the United States Merit System Protection Board released the results of its
study examining the prevalence, cost, and effects of harassment in the federal work-
place. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE: Is IT A PROBLEM? (1981). The Board reported that harass-
ment was a problem in the federal workplace. Id. Forty-two percent of the female and
15% of the male respondents reported being sexually harassed. Id. at 5. Further, the
Board estimated that the cost of the harassment to the government in the two years
studied was at least $189 million. Id. at 84.
There are numerous other studies that confirm these results. For an excellent anno-
tated bibliography of studies, articles, and books on the problem, see id. at app. H.
39. See, e g., U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Government: An Update 4 (1988) ("Uninvited and unwanted sexual attention
was experienced by almost the identical proportion of the work force in 1987 as in 1980
*- [It] is still a pervasive, costly, and systemic problem"). For a discussion of the
effects of sexual harassment, see Fran Sepler, Sexual Harassment: From Protective Re-
sponse to Proactive Prevention, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 61, 66-68 (1990).
40. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
41. Id. at 67. The court explained that harassment must be unwelcome and "must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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Court's ruling, Title VII remedies do not offer suitable relief to victims
of harassment.42 A court awards a victim who remains on the job an
injunction against the behavior, which often does little more than in-
tensify the conduct.43 To the victim who leaves her employment, a
court awards reinstatement, which, for obvious reasons, is
undesirable.'
Finally, the expanding comprehensiveness in employment discrimi-
nation laws at the state level45 was a factor that influenced Congress to
expand Title VII remedies. The state provisions recognized that the
egregious conduct associated with many acts of discrimination, as well
as the emotional and psychological harm to the victim, exceed purely
economic injury." The employment discrimination provisions of some
state statutes offer more comprehensive coverage and provide for both
equitable and legal remedies to redress discrimination related inju-
ries.47 In fact, plaintiffs in some states consciously elect to bring suit in
state court because of the favorable remedies available.48
42. See Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1357 (stating that "because the Court failed to
focus on the distinctions in relief created by § 1981, Vinson truly creates a right without
a remedy"). See generally Mathews, supra note 6 (discussing how Title VII fails to
eliminate sexual harassment in the work place and provides inadequate relief for
victims).
43. Cf. H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Committee on
Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 121-23
(1991) (testimony of Jacqueline Morris) ("I returned to work and have remained there
since.... Today, the situation remains far from acceptable").
44. Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1357 n.23. The author notes that courts often find no
constructive discharge when the employee voluntarily leaves the employment. Id. Fur-
thermore, even when the employee is fired, courts often find that the discharge is unre-
lated to the harassment and, therefore, reinstatement is not possible. Id. See also id. at
1358 n.235 (listing literature criticizing the relief available in sexual harassment cases).
45. For a general discussion of state employment discrimination law, see Susan E.
Powley, Project, Exploring a Second Level of Parity: Suggestions for Developing an Ana-
lytical Framework for Forum Selection in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 44
VAND. L. REv. 641, 664-71 (1991).
46. See, eg., infra notes 62-64 discussing cases that exemplify how employment
discrimination injuries cannot easily be quantified for economic recovery.
47. See Powley, supra note 45, at 667-71 (analyzing how state statutes may prove
more advantageous to plaintiffs). For a list of the employment statutes of each state, see
3 EMPLOYMENT PRACTicEs GUIDE (CCH) (1991).
48. See Charles S. Mishkind & Beverly H. Burns, The Practical Labor Lawyer:
How the Supreme Court's Decision in Donnelly v. Yellow Freight May Affect Title VII
Claims, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 257, 260 (1990) (suggesting that plaintiffs in Michigan
are making "calculated decisions" to use state courts because of the state's broad reme-
dial provisions regarding employment discrimination). See also Guy Saperstein, Re-
sponse, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 509, 512 (1984-85) (noting that California
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/13
TITLE VII REMEDIES
During the debates on the Civil Rights legislation many victims tes-
tified before Congress as to the severe effects suffered as a result of their
employer's discriminatory conduct.49 Nonetheless, because Title VII
authorized only equitable relief,5 ° the courts compensated these victims
merely for the economic injury of a missed employment opportunity.5"
As a result of its inquiry, Congress acknowledged that discrimination
in the workplace was severe and widespread.5 2 Congress realized that
victims who suffered identical discrimination received greater protec-
tion and relief under section 1981 or a given state provision than under
Title VII.5 3 In sum, these factors exposed the Title VII remedy provi-
sion as wholly inadequate,54 and served instrumentally in Congress'
debate and final vote of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
B. Legislative History
The factors discussed above, together with a series of 1989 Supreme
Court decisions that increased the difficulty for an employee to bring
courts are very protective of employee rights); cf Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1307 (argu-
ing that "[t]he occasional availability of common law or state statutory claims does not
provide a sufficient substitute for a uniform national policy").
49. See generally H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings before the House
Committee on Labor and Education, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-120 (1991). In the com-
mittee hearing, Lois Robinson testified that as a result of her treatment on the job, she
suffered humiliation, degradation, sleeplessness, neck pains, nausea, and missed many
days of work from fear of the sexual harassment she would face. Id. at 78. Another
worker explained in a written statement that as a result of the severe sexual harassment
she faced on the job, she suffered nervousness, sleeplessness, blotches and welts on her
legs and back, breathing difficulties, and was instructed by her doctor to leave her em-
ployment to avoid a nervous breakdown. Id. at 121-37 (written statement of Jackie
Morris).
50. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text noting courts' interpretations to
only offer equitable remedies.
51. See, eg., infra notes 65-66 for illustrative cases.
52. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text discussing the prevalence of har-
assment within society.
53. See supra notes 23-48 and accompanying text comparing Title VII with § 1981
and relevant state laws.
54. See LARSON, supra note 17, at 14 (Special Pamphlet 1992) ("The impetus for
this provision did not come from a Supreme Court decision, but rather from a long-
standing notion that, for certain discrimination plaintiffs, existing remedies were simply
not adequate."); see also 136 CONG. Rec. E2478-03 (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (extension
of remarks by Honorable Augustus F. Hawkins) ("Our society holds gender, religious,
and national origin discrimination to be just as reprehensible [as racial discrimination],
but victims of these types of intentional job bias cannot recover [the same] damages
under Federal law.").
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an action against his or her employer, inspired the demand for civil
rights legislation."5 From the outset, neither Congress nor the Presi-
dent seriously questioned whether victims of employment discrimina-
tion deserved a more complete form of relief. 6 Rather, debate on the
matter revolved around what form the additional relief should take.5 7
The version of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 that Congress submitted to
the President provided for complete compensatory damages, but lim-
ited punitive damages to the greater of either $150,000 or the amount
of the compensatory damages award.58 In his message accompanying
the veto of the 1990 Act, President Bush criticized the provision for its
similarity to the already failing tort system.5 9 The President's version
contained a provision that gave judges the power to grant victims of
employment discrimination an "equitable monetary award" of up to
$150,000. 60
Despite the President's veto, many members of Congress supported
civil rights legislation the next year that did not limit recoverable dam-
ages.61 Those members who advocated against limitations generally
55. See S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991). Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 provides: "The purposes of this act are... (4) to respond to recent decisions of
the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to the victims of discrimination." Id.
Besides the compensatory and punitive damages provision, the subject of this Note,
the Act also covers disparate impact, business necessity, bias after hiring, challenges to
consent decrees, timeliness of challenges to seniority systems, mixed motive, expert wit-
ness fees, extraterritoriality, jury trials, interest and filing time in actions against the
federal government, and "race norming" of test scores. S. 1745. For a summary of the
particular Supreme Court cases and Congress' response, see Special Supplement, Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Summary and Full Text, 131 Labor Rel. Rep. (BNA) (1991).
56. See generally Alexander, supra note 29, at 620 (discussing Congress' and Presi-
dent Bush's attitudes toward employment discrimination legislation).
57. See generally Richard L. Alfred & Thomas A. Knowlton, Civil Rights Act Will
Encourage Federal Claims, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 9, 1991 (discussing the congres-
sional debate on how to amend the Act to cure its inadequacies).
58. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(A)-(B) (1990).
59. 136 CONG. Rnc. S16,418 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (Veto message of President
Bush on S. 2104). In his message, President Bush stated that the Civil Rights Act of
1990 "radically alter[ed] the remedial provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964" and suggested that the scheme "replac[ed] measures designed to foster concilia-
tion and settlement" with a plan modeled on a tort system in a state of crisis. Id.
60. S. 611, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(b)(l)-(m) (1991). The President's bill permit-
ted recovery of the "equitable monetary award" only in cases of sexual harassment. Id.
For a critical analysis of President Bush's "equitable monetary award," see Alexander,
supra note 29, at 624.
61. See, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1991). The damages provision in H.R. 1
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highlighted two points. The first was the personal testimony of victims
of discrimination who told of their injuries and the lack of adequate
compensation.6 2 Some victims were professionals who suffered serious
injuries to their careers when their employers refused to promote them
for discriminatory reasons. 63 Others were victims of racial or sexual
harassment who suffered emotional and psychological injuries. 6  Case
law indicates further that those who remain with their employer re-
ceive little more than an injunction,65 while those who leave receive
only backpay.66 At the time of the testimony, courts did not fashion
was identical to the provision in S. 2104, supra note 58, except the former removed the
limit on the amount of punitive damages recoverable.
62. See, eg., 137 CONG. REc. S15,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini). In proposing to amend the limitations provision of S. 1745 (Civil Rights
Act of 1991) by reinstating the limitation provision of the 1990 Civil Rights Act, see
supra note 58, Senator DeConcini noted the following:
Title VII does not address the needs of the victims .... For example, Helen
Brooms was sexually harassed on the job. She finally quit her job after her supervi-
sor showed her sexually explicit photographs and threatened her life. She fell
down a flight of stairs trying to get away from him and subsequently suffered from
severe depression. Although the court found her civil rights had been violated, she
received no compensation at all for her medical injuries.
137 CONG. REc. at S15,020. See also Civil Rights Act of 1991: Report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. 24-29 (1991).
63. See, eg., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (senior man-
ager was denied partnership because she was unable to maintain her femininity while
becoming an effective manager); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986)
(lease analyst who was demoted and fired because it was "dangerous" for a woman to
get too much education, could not recover for setbacks to her career under Title VII);
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (attor-
ney permanently passed over for partnership on discriminatory grounds felt compelled
to leave employment but could find no comparable work).
64. See supra note 39 and infra notes 65-67 for general studies and illustrative cases
concerned with the effects of discrimination.
65. See, eg., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1468 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (awarding harassment victim, who stayed with her employer, an injunction and
one dollar in nominal damages). Often victims of severe discrimination are forced to
leave their jobs before they institute a suit, which only provides the opportunity to re-
cover backpay. See generally infra note 66 discussing cases that awarded backpay.
66. See, eg., Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1989) (awarding victim
of discrimination, who was illegally discharged because she "was a mother," backpay
and reinstatement without seniority); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (awarding backpay and injunctive relief to victim of severe sexual har-
assment who was forced to take "unprecedented" demotion with substantial pay reduc-
tion); Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (awarding
backpay and injunctive relief to police officer who suffered "massive anxiety and depres-
sion" and "stroke-level" high blood pressure as a result of severe sexual harassment).
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compensation for medical expenses, mental suffering, or harm to one's
professional reputation.67 Opponents of the limitations pointed to
these accounts in support of their stance for full compensation regard-
less of the cost to an employer.68
Second, Congress noted that opponents of statutory limits had de-
vised a remedial scheme that would not overburden employers eco-
nomically.69 The National Women's Law Center conducted a study
that examined employment discrimination claims brought under sec-
tion 1981 between the years 1980 and 1990.70 The results of the study
indicated that jury awards tended to be conservative and had not
forced companies out of business.7 1 Opponents of limitations argued
that because of the similarities between a section 1981 action and a
Title VII action, the level of awards would also parallel each other.72
67. See, e.g., Williams v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 627 F. Supp. 752
(W.D. Mo. 1986) (denying victim of race discrimination damages under Title VII for
resulting emotional distress and psychological problems); Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (noting that "[w]ere compensatory damages
available to a Title VII plaintiff, this Court would not hesitate to enter such an award in
this case" to a victim of religious harassment who "suffered mental anguish and humili-
ation at [the employer's] hands").
68. See, e.g., 137 CONG. RIc. S15,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini). Senator DeConcini argued that "[i]n the situation where an employer's
actions have caused an exceptional amount of out-of-pocket expenses or pain and suffer-
ing, the amount of punitive damages should be correspondingly higher." Id.
69. Id. Senator DeConcini noted that a Washington, D.C. law firm's empirical
study showed that unlimited damages provisions under § 1981 had not resulted in "un-
limited awards and bonanzas for lawyers." Id. See infra note 71 for the study's specific
findings.
70. Wendy White et al., Analysis of Damage Awards Under § 1981 (Mar. 14, 1990)
(unpublished manuscript available from the National Women's Law Center). The Na-
tional Women's Law Center commissioned the Washington, D.C., law firm of Shea &
Gardner to conduct this study. 137 CONG. Rnc. S15,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (re-
marks of Sen. DeConcini).
71. 136 CONG. REc. E2478 (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (report of the National Wo-
men's Law Center). This study, introduced into the Record by the Honorable Augustus
F. Hawkins of California, merits close examination. Id. In short, the study found that,
in actions brought under § 1981, "plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive
damages in only 68 of 576 reported cases between 1980 and 1989. Plaintiffs received
less than $50,000 - for both compensatory and punitive damages combined - in two-
thirds of these 68 cases, and received more than $200,000 in only three instances." Id.
72. See, e.g., 137 CONG. R1c. S18,375 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy). Senator Kennedy argued as follows: "The standard of proof and the defini-
tion of intentional discrimination are identical under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
the long-standing race discrimination statute [§ 1981]. There is no reason to expect
significantly more litigation, or significantly larger jury awards under the 1991 Act."
Id. See also 137 CONG. REC. S15,020 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (remarks of Sen. DeCon-
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Alternatively, proponents of limiting damages pointed to three main
factors in support of their position. First, supporters rejected the re-
sults of the National Women's Law Center study and insisted that
large jury awards were inevitable7" under a provision with no caps.
Additionally, those congressmen projected that limitless liability would
force employers out of business.74 In particular, they opposed a provi-
sion that would place unlimited liability on an employer irrespective of
its size or the culpability of its behavior.75 Second, proponents argued
that the possibility of high jury awards would create a "litigation
machine" that would compensate lawyers,7 6 but not victims," and
cini). Senator DeConcini stated: "Opponents of the damages provisions argue that it
will subject employers to enormous liability and put them out of business. A recent
study... challenges this assertion." Id.
For a general discussion of the implications arising from the fact that § 1981 and
Title VII are co-extensive, see Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1348-49. The author argues:
This history [that Title VII and § 1981 are considered co-extensive] is significant in
several respects. First, it helps to explain why so little attention has been directed
to Title VIL's remedial inadequacies. Second, it demonstrates that there is nothing
inherently unfair or unwieldy about the use of tort-based concepts of relief in the
discrimination context. Third, the co-existence of dual remedies for some discrimi-
nation claimants and not others points to the underlying inequity that has per-
vaded the Title VII remedial scheme.
Id.
73. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S15,356 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (letter from Zachary
D. Fasman to Sen. Dole). In the letter, Mr. Fasman suggests that a limited punitive
damages provision with an unlimited compensatory damages provision would cause ju-
ries to exaggerate compensatory damages to include punitive damages. Id.
74. See infra note 75 for one Congressman's view on the consequences of unlimited
liability.
75. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H9404 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (remarks of Rep.
Bartlett). Representative Bartlett criticized the 1990 Act's remedial provision, which
capped punitive damages at $150,000, as failing to consider the specific business or vio-
lation and causing employers to go out of business. Id. Specifically, Representative
Bartlett argued:
I want to note the cap relates to all employers, large and small. I would note that
the so-called cap [applies] regardless of the size of the employer or the size of the
offense, in addition to all damages that might be awarded in the category of com-
pensatory damages....
... [This is] in effect lowering the boom and putting the employer out of business
regardless of the size of the employer or the nature of the offense.
Id.
76. 137 CONG. REc. H3874 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Dornan).
Representative Dornan, who was vigorously in favor of statutory limitations, argued:
"Another effect of this bill is perfectly clear. If H.R. I becomes law, there will no longer
be unemployed lawyers in the United States.... H.R. I would be more aptly named the
Trial Lawyers Relief Act of 1991." Id. See also 136 CONG. REc. S10,321 (daily ed.
July 23, 1990) (Editorial from Washington Post by Zachary D. Fasman offered into the
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would undermine the conciliatory goal of the Act. 8 Finally, and per-
haps most persuasively, proponents of limitations pointed to the Presi-
dent's veto of the 1990 Act and argued that the President would surely
veto an act with no limitations whatsoever.7 9
Ultimately, Congress reached a compromise.Y° The lawmakers in-
serted language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that preserved both
compensatory and punitive damages.81 A victim of discrimination
may now recover compensatory damages if the employer has discrimi-
nated intentionally,82 but may recover punitive damages only if the em-
ployer acts with malice or reckless indifference toward the victim's
rights.83 Nevertheless, the 1991 Act limits the amount of non-eco-
Record by Sen. Dole) (noting that the "proposal to create a federal tort law system for
employment discrimination cases is likely to benefit no one but lawyers").
77. See, e.g., 137 CONG. Rac. H3874 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep.
Doman) ("This Bill would not address one problem confronting America's black
underclass").
78. See, eg., 136 CONG. REc. S10,321 (daily ed. July 23, 1990) (remarks of Sen.
Dole). Conciliation is a primary objective of Title VII, which contains a mandatory
conciliation provision to encourage dispute settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). For a
general discussion of settlements and the conciliatory emphasis of Title VII, see 2 LAR-
SON, supra note 17, §§ 56.00-.43. For a discussion of how the potential for high jury
verdicts will influence the conciliation aim of the Act, see Alexander, supra note 29, at
623-25.
79. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. S7021 (daily ed. July 4, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Dan-
forth). Commenting on H.R. 1, which contained no limitations provision, and intro-
ducing the limitation that was finally signed into law, Senator Danforth stated: "[n]o
matter how well meaning they are in the House of Representatives, there is almost no
chance that that bill which passes the House will be enacted into law in its present
form." Id.
80. See President Bush's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 226
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-1 (Nov. 21, 1991). The President stated that the [Civil
Rights Act of 1991] "adopts a compromise under which 'caps' have been placed on the
amount [of compensatory and punitive damages] that juries may award. Id. See infra
note 84 for the text of the limitation provision.
81. Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VII] against a respon-
dent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination... prohibited under [Ti-
tle VII], . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages... in addition to any relief authorized by [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(l) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991]....
42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
82. Id.
83. 137 CONG. Ruc. at H9517. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981a(b)(1) now
provides: "A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent.., if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent
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nomic compensatory and punitive damages an employee may recover
depending on the size of the employer.84 At the time the Act passed in
the Senate, many senators voiced their opposition to the limitations
provision, but nonetheless supported the bill because of the urgency to
enact legislation to protect the victims of employment discrimination.85
C. Lifting the Caps on Compensatory and Punitive Damages
The limits that survived final passage of the Act should not diminish
the strength of congressional opposition to caps on damages. Less than
a week after President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into
law, 6 Democratic and Republican party senators introduced bills to
lift the caps on compensatory and punitive damages.87 Both parties
cited the overriding importance of implementing the principles con-
tained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as the reason for compromising
engaged in a discriminatory practice... with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(1).
84. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in § 1981a(b)(3), adopted the Senate's language
from S. 1745, supra note 55, at § 102(b)(3) and now provides:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of puni-
tive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining
party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees. . . , $50,000; and
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees .... $100,000; and
(C) in the case of respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 em-
ployees .... $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees ....
$300,000.
Id. One must keep in mind that this provision applies to non-economic and future
economic compensatory damages while leaving economic damages that have occurred
at the time of suit fully compensable regardless of the amount or size of the employer.
85. See, e.g., 137 CONG. R.Ec. S15,489 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (remarks of Sen.
Leahy) ("While I believe this was the best bill we could get the President to sign, I...
do not believe... this legislation ends the necessity for further reform.... Like others, I
believe that the inequity of placing limits on damages.., will need to be addressed in
[the] future."); 137 CONG. R c. at S15,490 (remarks of Sen. Durenberger) ("[In the
name of temporary compromise, in the name of getting this bill to become law, I have
withdrawn [my amendment to lift the caps]").
86. See supra notes 11 and 15 discussing the enactment of the law.
87. See supra note 16 discussing the bills that Senators Hatch and Kennedy intro-
duced after the Act passed.
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and accepting the statute with liability caps.88
More importantly, however, the sponsors of both bills noted that the
1991 Act codified the very disparity it set out to correct.89 Prior to the
1991 Act, victims of racial discrimination could recover unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages under section 1981, while Title
VII limited victims of sex, religious, or disability discrimination to eq-
uitable remedies." Under the 1991 Act, courts maintain unbridled dis-
cretion to award relief for claims under section 1981,91 while victims of
sex, religious, or disability discrimination only have an opportunity to
recover an amount based on the size of the employer rather than the
egregiousness of the employer's conduct.
92
On November 26, 1991," Senator Hatch introduced the Employee
Equity and Job Preservation Act of 1991.9' Senator Hatch cited the
discrepancy between section 1981 and the new Title VII as prompting
the need for the bill.95 The Employee Equity and Job Preservation Act
addresses both the victims of discrimination and the small business
owner.96 The Act lifts all caps on compensatory and punitive damages
88. 137 CONG. Rac. at S18,337, S18,375. Senator Hatch stated that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 was a "significant step forward" but pointed out that it "failed to
achieve total parity between the damages available to [those covered by the Act] and the
damages available to those covered under section 1981." Id. at S18,337. Senator Ken-
nedy likewise declared victory in the two year struggle but noted that the victory was
"partial and temporary." Id. at S18,375.
89. Id. at S18,338, S18,375. Senator Hatch stated that the purpose of his bill is "to
eliminate [one of many] double standards for women, persons with disabilities, and vic-
tims of religious discrimination." Id. at S18,338. After pointing out the successes of
the 1991 Act, Senator Kennedy noted, "[u]nfortunately, the new remedy created a glar-
ing inequity by placing a ceiling on the amount of damages that can be recovered." Id.
at S18,375.
90. See generally supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text (providing an overview
of equitable remedies).
91. S. 1745, supra note 55, § 102(b)(4). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
"[n]othing... shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief available under [42
U.S.C. § 1981]." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4).
92. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text for discussion of the statutory
caps placed on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages.
93. 137 CONG. REc. S18,337 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
94. S. 2053, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
95. 137 CONG. REC. S18,337, S18,338 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
96. Id. at S18,338. When he introduced the Act, Senator Hatch queried: "Are the
interests of women employed by small businesses served when a jury award for damages
is so large that it could potentially force that employer out of business and cost all of its
employees their jobs?" Id.
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except for the category of the smallest employers, that is, those with
less than one hundred employees.97 For those employers, the cap
would remain at $50,000.98 Senator Hatch stressed that such an excep-
tion was not an exemption.99 Rather, it served as protection against
the damaging effect that a crippling jury award may have on a small
business' growth and economic viability."°
On the same day that Senator Hatch introduced his bill,"°1 Senator
Kennedy proposed the Equal Remedies Act of 1991.102 The Equal
Remedies Act would lift all caps on compensatory and punitive dam-
ages regardless of the employer's size. o3 Senator Kennedy emphasized
that the disparity between relief under section 1981 and Title VII espe-
cially motivated him to introduce the bill. 1" He relied on the National
Women's Law Center study'0 5 to assert that the damage awards would
not be significantly larger without the caps.' 6 Senator Kennedy main-
tained that the caps only resulted in the unfortunate phenomenon
where the most seriously injured were prevented from obtaining com-
plete relief, and the most reprehensible offenders were protected from
full liability. 107
The debate on tort reform over statutory limitations of damage
awards is complex. Nonetheless, a general understanding of the argu-
ments on both sides of the debate is helpful in evaluating whether Con-
gress should lift the limitations on damages under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.
97. Id.
98. Id. See also supra note 84 for the statutory language categorizing employers
and limiting their relative liability.
99. 137 CONG. REc. at S18,338. In making this point Senator Hatch pointed to
other legislative exceptions pertaining to small businesses. Id. He stated that this pro-
vision paralleled the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act,
as it extended Title VII's exception for employers with fewer than fifty employees. Id.
100. Id.
101. 137 CONG. REc. S18,375 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
102. S. 2062, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
103. 137 CONG. REc. at S18,375.
104. Id. See also supra note 89 for the Senator's remarks.
105. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the National
Women's Law Center's study and its findings.
106. 137 CONG. REC. S18,375.
107. Id.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
410 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:391
II. STATUTORY CAPS AND TORT REFORM
When President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law,
he referred to its limitation provision as setting an important precedent
in tort reform. 108 Indeed, the 1980s was a decade of heightened aware-
ness of the need for tort reform. 1°9 During the 1980s, most states en-
acted some form of legislation that limited or abandoned the jury's
ability to award punitive and non-economic compensatory damages in
tort cases.' 10 Yet, the debate surrounding the wisdom of such legisla-
tion continues. 11
Proponents of limiting or eliminating these damages generally point
to the outbreak of increasingly large jury awards to illustrate the need
for reform.112 Such proponents argue that juries have too much discre-
tion to fashion damage awards,113 which in turn causes an instability
and breakdown in the system." 4 With respect to non-economic com-
108. See supra note 11 for a direct quotation from President Bush's statement.
109. See generally Komesar, supra note 12. The author points out that scholarly
debate over tort reform has existed for fifty years, but in the last decade "critics have
called for radical reform or abandonment of the torts system." Id. at 23. For a thor-
ough discussion of the problems with current tort law and possible alternative methods
of compensation, see Gary T. Schwartz et al., Symposium: Alternative Compensation
Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CAL. L. REv. 548 (1985).
110. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 908, 956-57 nn.210-13 (1989)
(describing the various types of statutory caps the states have enacted); Toy, supra note
13, at 331-35 (same).
111. See infra notes 112-32 and accompanying text for discussion of both sides to
the debate.
112. See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 12. The authors assert that the
proponents of tort reform present two types of evidence in support of their argument.
Id. at 14. According to the authors, reformers use "horror stories and anecdotes about
jury verdicts involving punitive damages, and aggregate the data on frequency and size
of the awards." Id. The authors also argue that reformers use the two types of evidence
to establish four propositions on which they base the remainder of their argument about
punitive damages' harmful effects. Id. The four propositions are: (1) punitive damages
are routinely awarded, (2) punitive damages are routinely awarded in large amounts, (3)
the frequency and size of these awards is rapidly increasing, and (4) propositions 1, 2, &
3 are national in scope. Id.
113. See, eg., Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preac-
cident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. Rlv. 898, 899-900
(1985) (noting a plaintiff's attorney's belief that "juries vote based on their impressions,
their feelings, their biases, and their prejudices, not the facts of the case").
114. Id. at 910. The author argues that, under today's system, the potential for
recovery of damages beyond the economic value of an injury undermines the out-of-
court settlement process. Id. He suggests that defendants are afraid to make settlement
offers because such an offer "may simply excite an energetic claimant's counsel to hold
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pensatory damages, in particular, proponents of limitations argue that
these injuries are not subject to precise measurement I15 and, when
compounded with the great discretion a jury holds, the resulting
awards are unpredictable and inconsistent." 6
With respect to punitive damages, proponents of limitations advance
several arguments.' 17 First, proponents argue that large punitive dam-
age awards deplete a tort-feasor's funds, thereby forcing some of the
injured to go uncompensated. 18 Second, proponents challenge the va-
lidity of deterrence as a goal of tort law, 119 or more specifically, argue
that the unpredictability of the awards undermines any deterrent ele-
out for much more." Id. at 902. See also Toy, supra note 13, at 326-27 (suggesting that
unlimited punitive damages may cause overdeterrence in the sense that a defendant will
shy away from an act even if it would be socially useful). See generally Bovbjerg et al.,
supra note 113, at 908 ("The open-ended and unpredictable nature of tort exposure has,
in turn, threatened the liability insurance system that funds most tort compensation");
Komesar, supra note 12, at 23 ("Manufacturers, service professionals, and insurance
companies have become increasingly impatient with the costs and foibles of the torts
system"); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufac-
turers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1, 15 (1982) ("When [punitive damages
are] transferred to the complex bureaucracy of the modem manufacturing concern, the
fit is awkward in many respects").
115. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Per-
sonal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Loss, 77
Nw. U. L. Rnv. 589, 591 (1982) ("Translating non-pecuniary loss (pain) into pecuniary
terms (dollars) is, like establishing fault, very difficult."). See also Stanley Ingber, Re-
thinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772, 778 (1985)
("Translating pain and suffering or emotional distress into monetary terms poses tre-
mendous problems of proof because .... no market exists to provide a standard for
compensating a victim of such loss. Such injuries have no measurable dimensions,
mathematical or financial.").
116. See O'Connell, supra note 113, at 900. The author's primary point is that
many external factors cause the jury to arrive at a given award. Id. For example, he
suggests that the credibility of expert witnesses, in the minds of the jurors, turns on the
expert's appearance and mannerisms, which causes very different awards for very simi-
lar injuries. Id. Furthermore, he suggests that injuries similar in severity will produce
fluctuating verdicts based on the appearance of the victim (e.g., back injury versus ex-
tensive visible scarring). Id.
117. See generally Owen, supra note 114 (discussing the frustrations of personal
injury tort law arising from punitive damages awards); David G. Owen, Punitive Dam-
ages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258 (1976) (considering the
debate over punitive damages).
118. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that the possibility of puni-
tive damages might invite a "race to the courthouse" whereby "those plaintiffs arriving
first deplete the funds available to compensate all wronged parties").
119. See generally Sales & Cole, supra note 11, at 1158-64 (arguing that neither
deterrence nor punishment are viable theories for punitive damages).
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ment.'20 Finally, proponents of limitations argue that the standards of
proof within the tort system are unacceptably low.121 Alternatively,
they note that when a court uses a higher standard, the standard is too
confusing for the jury to apply accurately and consistently.' 22
Opponents of limiting punitive and non-economic compensatory
damages respond to the above-noted attacks in a number of ways. The
opponents first assert that powerful political lobbies have created a mis-
perception regarding the extent and severity of such awards.123 Oppo-
120. See generally supra note 114 (discussing how unlimited damage awards fail to
deter potential violators due to the unpredictability of the amount of such awards). Cf
Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 558 (1985). The
author points to numerous factors that he suggests undermine the deterrent function of
tort law. Id. First, individuals with no wealth, as well as under-capitalized companies
are not threatened by an unfavorable judgment. Id. at 571-72. Second, because of an
employer's vicarious liability for individual employees' actions, the actual tort-feasors
(employees) are not deterred. Id. at 572. Furthermore, because tort law's primary
function is compensation, inconsistent priorities exist because of the inadequacy of tort
awards for certain injuries (e.g., it is less expensive for the injurer to cause a death than
to permanently injure). Id. Market imperfections allow the cost of some damages to be
passed on to consumers. Id. at 573. Finally, liability insurance in some jurisdictions
pay partial costs of punitive damages which results in a shift of the direct economic
deterrent from the tort-feasor to the insurance companies. Id.
121. See, eg., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40
ALA. L. REv. 975, 991-99 (1989) (arguing that the procedural safeguards of criminal
law are not available even though punitive damages is a quasi-criminal remedy). One
procedural inadequacy of particular concern is that the preponderance standard leads to
mistakes which should not be tolerated in a "quasi-criminal" proceeding. Id.
122. See Sales & Cole, supra note 11, at 1131-38. The authors point out that so far
as the culpability spectrum is concerned, the decision whether or not to award punitive
damages is clear (i.e. punitive damages are always appropriate for intentional conduct
and never appropriate for only negligent conduct). Id. In between the extremes of
intent and negligence, are terms such as gross negligence, recklessness, and willful and
wanton, which the authors characterize as "confusing and devoid of any effective defini-
tion." Id. at 1137. They claim further that "[b]ecause of the absence of any under-
standable standards of measurement and the inevitably inconsistent interpretations by
juries, every defendant increasingly is subject to the vagaries of individual jurisdictions
and an uninformed jury." Id. at 1138.
123. See Daniels & Martin supra note 12, at 10-11. The authors state:
The problems for American society occasioned by this distressed [punitive dam-
ages] system out of control have reached crisis proportions, the reformers claim.
The effects of these problems require fundamental change in the doctrine of puni-
tive damages, if not its outright abolition. Their effort to produce a broad base of
support conducive to reform includes the establishment of public relations and lob-
bying organizations to spearhead the campaign.
Id. The authors conducted an extensive empirical investigation of the frequency, size,
and dispersion of punitive damage awards. Id. at 28-62. The results of the study refute
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nents also claim that procedural modifications, 124 trial court control,
and appellate review help minimize instances of jury abuse.125 With
respect to non-economic compensatory damages, opponents refute the
argument that such awards are speculative 126 and unsubstantiated.
127
Regarding punitive damages, opponents reject the assertion that their
unpredictable nature undermines the deterrent objective.' 28 In fact,
they claim it is the unpredictability itself that encourages a higher level
of care.' 29 This is particularly true in cases of intentional conduct. 30
Limited or set punitive damages would allow an intentional tort-feasor
to conduct a precise cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to
act.' 3 ' When the potential cost of an act is unpredictable, however, the
the main propositions of the reformers. Id. at 61-62. See also supra note 112 for a
discussion of these propositions.
124. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 12, at 9. The primary procedural safeguard
that both scholars and courts favor is the "clear and convincing" standard of proof in
place of the traditional preponderance standard. Id. Other safeguards include provid-
ing for a state fund to receive a percentage of the punitive damage award, altering the
pleading requirements, limiting evidence of defendant's wealth, prohibiting insurance
for punitive damage awards, and providing a bifurcated trial. See 2 JAMES D. GHIARDI
& JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNrrivE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 21.12-.22 (1985).
125. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN THE PU-
NIIVE DAMAGES AREA (1986-1989), Punitive Damages Update (Nov. 9, 1989). The
American Tort Reform Association reports that eighteen states replaced the "prepon-
derance" standard with the 'clear and convincing' standard between 1986 and 1988. Id.
at 2.
126. See Komesar, supra note 12, at 58.
127. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 12, at 9 (noting proponents of punitive dam-
ages enhance their arguments based on a lack of empirical evidence that jury awards
inherently consist of excessive punitive calculations).
128. See, eg., Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency
in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1385-1406 (1987) ("While the open-ended and
to a large degree arbitrary magnitude of punitive damages may call into question the
fairness of these damages, optimal deterrence is not inconsistent with unlimited and
variable awards."). See also Toy, supra note 13, at 324-25 ("Though the unpredictabil-
ity argument favoring statutory caps is intuitively appealing, it makes less sense when
viewed in light of the ... principal goals of extraordinary sanctions.").
129. See Johnston, supra note 128, at 1402-06 (discussing the potential utility that
punitive damages could play "as an instrument of optimal deterrence"). See also Toy,
supra note 13, at 324-25 ("Concerns about unpredictable punitive damage awards be-
come less significant when one remembers that such awards are intended not only to
punish.., but also to deter .. ").
130. See Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 79, 86 (1982) (arguing that an intentional wrongdoer, who is liable only for actual
damages, will be neither surprised nor disappointed in having to pay such damages).
131. See Toy, supra note 13, at 325. The author illustrates this point as follows:
"[I]f the [defendant] expects a profit of $300,000 from a wrongful act (after paying
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threat that the contemplated conduct could cost more than any antici-
pated benefit is more likely to encourage the intentional tort-feasor to
choose inaction or appropriate action. 132
III. ANALYSIS
A. Non-Economic Compensatory Damages
To remove the caps on Title VII's non-economic compensatory dam-
ages will enable courts to fully compensate victims of intentional dis-
crimination. Victims of severe discrimination often suffer prolonged
emotional and psychological harm.133 Under the current provision, an
award of compensatory damages may not be sufficient to cover the vic-
tim's future medical expenses. Moreover, the current scheme fails to
account for pain and suffering, or the detrimental effects such treat-
ment might have on the victim's professional reputation or quality of
life.'34 The problem of inadequate compensation does not occur under
section 1981 when a victim of racial discrimination suffers an identical
injury. 135 A Title VII provision with no caps will permit full compen-
sation to a victim of any type of intentional employment
discrimination.
The primary argument supporting the use of a statutory limitation
compensatory damages), and if a statute caps punitive damages at $250,000, for exam-
ple, then [the defendant] is likely to commit the act anyway since he still can expect to
gain at least $50,000." Id. at 326. See also Johnston, supra note 128, at 1385-1406
("[Statutory] caps could severely weaken incentives for safety by taking away the threat
of high damages necessary to counteract the incentive weakening effect of punitive
safeguards.").
132. See WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987); Toy, supra note 13, at 327 (noting that the goal of punitive damages
is not to fine tune or optimize conduct, but rather to eradicate undesired conduct).
133. See, eg., Fran Sepler, Sexual Harassment From Protective Response to Proac-
tive Prevention, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 61, 67-68 (1990) ("victims of sexual
harassment ... face serious emotional and psychological problems"). Studies have
found the effects of harassment to include stress, headaches, vomiting, insomnia, dam-
age to self esteem, personal safety, and reputation. Id. at 67. See also U.S. MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 39, at 41 ("Victims pay all the intangible
emotional costs inflicted by anger, humiliation, frustration, withdrawal, dysfunction in
family life, or other damage that can be sexual harassment's aftermath.").
134. See supra note 84 for limits on the amount of damages that can be awarded.
See also Mathews, supra note 6, at 301 (suggesting that remedies beyond those provided
in the 1991 Act are necessary for victims of harassment).
135. See, e.g., supra note 30 (comparing the relief given to a victim of racial dis-




on non-economic compensatory damages is insufficient to justify the
unequal compensation that is available to victims depending on the na-
ture of the intentional discrimination they suffered.136 The assertion
that unlimited damages will create a "litigation machine" is purely
speculative, for credible evidence contradicts the assertion.137 Addi-
tionally, there is no reason to believe that unlimited compensatory
damages serve as a greater incentive to litigate than expanded but lim-
ited damage awards. In any case, victims of intentional discrimination
should not be denied access to the courts' remedies in an effort to facili-
tate a more efficient judiciary. The burden is misplaced when these
innocent parties are constrained in favor of running judicial processes
more smoothly. 138
B. Punitive Damages
Lifting the caps on Title VII's punitive damages will strengthen the
message that intentional, malicious discrimination has no place in soci-
ety. The goal of punitive damages is the deterrence of, or ideally the
elimination of, undesirable conduct. 139 In the employment discrimina-
tion context, the actions of an employer can extend beyond socially
undesirable conduct to a point of being utterly intolerable."4 In addi-
tion, discrimination of this nature is not always isolated, but it may
continue over a period of time with many employees.14' Certainly
Congress did not mean to codify a policy that permits discrimination if
136. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79 for a summary of the arguments sup-
porting caps on compensatory damages.
137. See supra note 71 citing to a study's findings that, although juries were allowed
to award damages up to an unlimited amount in § 1981 actions, the actual amounts
awarded were not high. Analysis of the awards given in § 1981 cases indicates that "(1)
most plaintiffs' claims for damages will fail for procedural or substantive reasons, (2) of
those plaintiffs who do prevail, many will receive only equitable relief which is currently
available under Title VII, [and] (3) when a plaintiff does receive compensatory and
punitive damages, the award will probably be moderate.. . " WHITE ET AL., supra
note 70, at 2.
138. 137 CONG. Rnc. S18,338 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)
(acknowledging that the courts may indeed be crowded, but this is a problem to be
handled separately, and victims of discrimination deserve their day before a jury).
139. See supra note 132 for sources noting that the objective of punitive damages is
to stop unwanted conduct.
140. See, eg., supra notes 49, 62-63 describing the plight of some victims.
141. Congress was likely aware that the discrimination can become widespread as
the punitive damage limits do not restrict the number of claims an employer may have
to pay out. See supra note 84 setting forth the limits on damages for an individual
plaintiff. See also Mary A. Carey, Law Puts High Prce on Bias, Harassment Law
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the employer is able to pay; it meant to eliminate all discrimination
from the wcrkplace.
Interestingly, in the section 1981 context, very few punitive damage
awards have exceeded the Title VII statutory cap provision.1 4 2 This
suggests that juries are cautious in awarding punitive damages in the
employment discrimination context,1 4 3 and have not followed the
trend of excessive punitive damage awards that currently exists in tort
law. It also suggests that when a jury awards a large amount in
punitive damages, it is likely because the employer's conduct was par-
ticularly outrageous. 145 Limiting such awards allows the most serious
offenders to escape full liability.
As in the case of non-economic compensatory damages, the most
persuasive argument for limiting punitive damages under Title VII is
insufficient to justify the unequal treatment of women, religious minori-
ties, and the disabled. 146 The main argument is that the large jury
awards are likely to drive employers out of business.147 Initially, it is
notable that, as discussed above, an examination of punitive damage
awards under section 1981 makes this assertion unjustified.148 Assum-
ing that this risk exists however, it merely confirms the premise that
the threat of punitive damages for intentional employment discrimina-
tion will deter such conduct. Although it is true that even capped
damages will deter some employers,149 the unpredictable nature of
Makes Business Bias More Costly, THE HARTFORD COuRANT, Jan. 30, 1992, at D1
('Co-workers... can band together in a class action suit.").
142. See WHrrE ET AL., supra note 70, at 1-6. The National Women's Law Center
study found that in only three of 576 cases brought under § 1981 did the plaintiffs
recover over $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages combined. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at 2.
144. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of how some
perceive damages are awarded in tort cases.
145. See White et al., supra note 70, at 2. The fourth enumerated finding of the
National Women's Law Center study states: "If the employer engages in outrageous
intentional discrimination, in a few cases, the plaintiff may receive a more substantial
award. .. ." Id.
146. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for a summary of the arguments
made in support of limitations.
147. Id. Representative Bartlett was especially concerned with the potential for
jury awards to wipe out an employer's capital. See supra note 78.
148. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text discussing the low punitive
damage awards and possible explanations.
149. Senator Hatch's bill to lift the caps on damages except for small employers
recognizes that the threat of a maximum of $50,000 is sufficient to deter small business
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damage awards works to eradicate atrocious conduct at the workplace,
which is a primary objective for imposing punitive damages in the first
instance.' 50
C. Tort Reform
Many of the concerns that tort reform seeks to address are inapplica-
ble in the Title VII context. The reform primarily focuses on curtailing
the effects from excessive punitive damage awards.151 For instance,
tort reform efforts are targeted to reduce the amount of the damage
awards against manufacturers who, in the course of trying to create a
socially beneficial product, err and cause injury.1 52 This is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the Title VII case where the tort-feasor is engaging
in a socially destructive activity for the purpose of causing that harm.
In the manufacturing context, society uses punitive damages to en-
courage a higher standard of care, which is distinguishable from their
use pursuant to intentionally destructive conduct. The goal in the lat-
ter context is not to make people pay for mistakes, but to eliminate the
particular conduct in its entirety.1 5 3
The other major concern of tort reform is the procedural uncertain-
ties. Reformers that claim if a jury is granted unbridled discretion to
analyze facts based on a low standard of proof,'54 they are likely to
hold defendants liable for large sums."' Indeed, these are valid con-
persons. 137 CONG. REc. S18,338. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text for
discussion of Senator Hatch's bill and proposed exception for small businesses.
150. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text for analysis of how the unpre-
dictability of punitive damages causes tort-feasors to modify their conduct.
151. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text pointing out the finding that
juries do not award excessive punitive damages.
152. See generally Owen, supra note 114, at 13-18 (arguing that safety procedures
can be encouraged through punitive damages, but warning that care is required so as
not to "exact enormous punishment from an enterprise, acting on our greater social
conscious of today for decisions that were made pursuant to business ethics of times
past").
153. See generally supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text for discussion of how
intentional misconduct may change if there are no limits on punitive damages.
154. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text discussing the problems of giv-
ing juries wide discretion to award damages and the low standards of proof upon which
to base liability.
155. See, eg., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 845 F.2d 404 (2d
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (award of $6 million); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubble
Field, 319 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. App. 1984) ($8 million); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684
P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) ($2 million).
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cerns in the Title VII context as well. Yet, in the analogous section
1981 case law, juries have reassuringly exercised care in formulating
such awards. 156 Moreover, courts have been more willing to overturn
excessive jury awards in the employment context than in the tort
area. 157
IV. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress sought to elimi-
nate the disparity between Title VII remedies and the remedies of other
employment discrimination statutes. To this end, Congress provided
that all remedies available to a victim of intentional racial discrimina-
tion under section 1981 are also available to victims of intentional sex,
religious, or disability discrimination. When Congress created these
remedies, however, it attempted to concurrently protect businesses
from the effects of large jury awards. It therefore limited the amount
of compensation a victim may recover for sex, religious, or disability
discrimination. As a result, Congress codified the very disparity it set
out to correct. Only by eliminating the caps on compensatory and pu-
nitive damages available to Title VII discrimination victims can Con-
gress accomplish its initial goal of absolute equality.
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